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1. Introduction: Climate change as a security problem 
Climate change has developed into a key concern of a globalised world, with huge at-
tention in popular and media discourses and with consequences in virtually all fields of 
science and politics. As a cross-cutting issue, climate change is connecting distant and 
sometimes highly controversial fields. Hence it is not surprising that climate change is 
also grouped together with all imaginable regional and global conflicts. And, when ap-
plying a rather broad understanding of conflict, it is generally quite plausible that cli-
mate change is going to have an effect on intra- and international tensions. 
The security implications of climate change are still a relatively new issue in the evolu-
tion of the climate change debate. In the run-up to the fourth assessment report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon stated that climate change is likely to “(…) become a major driver of war and 
conflict” (UN NEWS CENTRE 2007: 1). At about the same time, a study was released by 
a think tank funded by the US Department of Defence (DoD), focussing on the impacts 
of climate change for the national security of the United States and explicitly dealing 
with strategic and operative challenges for the US military (CNA 2007). In the follow-
ing, a number of similar studies have been released by consulting agencies, para-statal 
and  non-governmental organisations, of which the study of the German Advisory 
Council on Global Change entitled “Climate Change as a Security Risk” attracted spe-
cial interest in the German-speaking world (WBGU 2008). Taking a more essayistic 
approach, a book entitled “Klimakriege” (Climate wars) by cultural psychologist Harald 
Welzer was published little later (Welzer 2008), further spreading the debate into a 
wider public. In the US, just recently the issue was picked up by journalist Gwynne 
Dyer and published under the same title (Dyer 2010). By now, the issue is well estab-
lished, if still heavily debated, both within public and even more within scientific dis-
courses on the social impacts of climate change. 
With regard to those rather loose, often unspecified connections recently established in 
different types of publications, it seems quite apt to talk about a ‘securitization’ of cli-
mate change, if this term is understood as describing nothing more than a growing asso-
ciation of a topic with security issues. In general, this trend of connecting conflicts to 
changing environmental conditions builds upon an older debate regarding the impacts of 
natural resource scarcity on conflicts (for many others see Homer-Dixon, 1999). Dalby 
(1992), Flitner & Soyez (2006), Oßenbrügge (2007) and Korf & Engeler (2007) have 
pointed out that linking natural degradation processes to security issues usually results 
in a problematical decrease of analytical perspectives and reduced options for problem 
solving. 
The term ‘securitization’ has been specified in political sciences, where it is mainly as-
sociated with the Copenhagen School around Ole Waever and Henry Buzan. Their secu-
ritization approach takes a constructivist perspective in analyzing how a political issue 
which is traditionally not part of security debates is introduced into the realm of secu-
rity. In their view, security is a “particular type of politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: vii) that 
can be applied to virtually any topic. Security studies do then not stop at analyzing mili-
tary and political sectors that classically deal with security issues, but also focus on 
other political spheres. By extending the view of security studies to, for example, the 
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environmental or economic sector, they are able to show similar processes and mecha-
nisms of securitization in different political environments.  
The main argument of the Copenhagen School is that security threats are constructed by 
speech acts rather than objective realities, and that in this perspective, almost any issue 
can be transformed into a security issue. The interesting question is then, of course, how 
this transformation works. Buzan et al. describe the mechanism as follows:  
“(…) when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an 
issue out of what under those conditions is ‘normal politics,’ we have a case of securiti-
zation. Thus, the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the in-
tersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have 
substantial political effects.” (ibid.: 25) 
It is central to the argument that an issue is transferred into security politics and with-
drawn from ‘normal’ political deliberation exclusively through rhetoric means of an 
actor targeting on the re-evaluation of a potential threat. Consequently, the focus of se-
curitization analyses is on speech acts of political actors and their success with regard to 
the enforcement of extraordinary measures: 
“The way to study securitization is to study discourse and political constellations: where 
does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient 
effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be 
obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential 
threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she 
would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization.” (ibid.: 25) 
The Copenhagen scholars clearly distinguish between the mere attempt to reframe an 
issue as security-related and the impact of such attempts on decision-making processes: 
only when a securitizing move culminates in an avoidance or circumvention of normal 
political procedures and rules, the Copenhagen School talks about a successful securiti-
zation:  
“A discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to a 
referent object does not itself create securitization – this is a securitizing move, but the 
issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such. (…) Securitization 
is not fulfilled only by breaking rules (which can take many forms) nor solely by exis-
tential threats (which can lead to nothing) but by cases of existential threats that legiti-
mize the breaking of rules.” (ibid.: 25)  
In their speech-act centered approach to security, the followers of the Copenhagen 
School distinguish between three units of securitization. First, the “referent object” de-
scribes the social entity that is declared as threatened by the potential peril. Second, 
“functional actors” are actors that do not perform the securitizing move, but in any way 
influence the sector that is subject of a securitization. The third unit is the “securitizing 
actor” which is of special interest for this report. Identifying a securitizing actor is a 
critical step in securitization theory and refers mainly to questions of legitimacy and 
representation: 
“A securitizing actor is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech act. 
Common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobby-
ists, and pressure groups. (…) Ultimately, individuals can always be said to be the ac-
tors, but if they are locked into strong roles it is usually more relevant to see as the 
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‘speaker’ the collectivities for which individuals are designated authoritative representa-
tives (…)” (ibid.: 40f.)  
In the following sections, we will particularly focus on the suggestions, ideas, com-
ments, and acts of political actors who are able to sanctify security-political acts in dif-
ferent political arenas.  
Based on documents and political processes on the part of the United Nations (UN), the 
European Union (EU) and German political actors, a potential “securitization” of cli-
mate change will be analysed and debated (2). The results of our analysis raises major 
doubts, that the respective actors are performing a securitizing move with regard to cli-
mate change in the sense of the Copenhagen School, and even more so, that we are wit-
nessing a successful securitization in that sense. 
At the same time, our analysis shows a clear differentiation of the security concept:  
traditional military/national security concepts are being supplemented and even more 
and more replaced by the broader concept of ‘human security’, which brings its own 
problematic implications (3). These results are finally summarised and some future re-
search perspectives are highlighted (4). 
 
2. Climate change as security issue in different political arenas 
2.1. Climate change and security in the United Nations  
On 17 April 2007 a meeting of the United Nations Security Council was called by Great 
Britain to discuss the potential impacts of climate change on peace and security. The 
session had been preceded by a background report of the British representative in the 
UN Security Council, identifying climate change as potential multiplier of existing con-
flicts (UN Security Council 2007). During the meeting, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-
Moon expressed his concerns regarding climate change and its potential for conflicts: 
“The Secretary-General outlined several ‘alarming, though not alarmist’ scenarios, in-
cluding limited or threatened access to energy increasing the risk of conflict, a scarcity 
of food and water transforming peaceful competition into violence, and floods and 
droughts sparking massive human migrations, polarizing societies and weakening the 
ability of countries to resolve conflicts peacefully.” (United Nations 2009) 
Even though doubts were raised that the UN Security Council was the adequate board to 
discuss climate change, the meeting was followed by a series of meetings, public state-
ments and resolutions. With Resolution 63/281, all Member States were asked to com-
ment on the relation between climate change and security matters (UN General Assem-
bly 2009a). The resulting statements show that the positions towards the issue diverge 
significantly. Whereas for example the reaction of the United States emphasises that 
“global climate change will have wide-ranging implications for many countries’ na-
tional security interests as impacts become more pronounced” (US Ambassador to the 
UN 2009), some governments show a fundamental scepticism towards the security as-
pects of climate change. For example, the Chinese UN ambassador replied:  
“There are fundamental differences between climate change and traditional security fac-
tors. (…) International cooperation in climate change should not place too much empha-
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sis on the implications of climate change for international security. Otherwise, it will do 
no good to the negotiation process for climate change, or tackling the problem at its root 
causes.” (Chinese Ambassador to the UN 2009) 
Summing up the different inputs of the member states and the materials previously re-
leased by the different stakeholders, the Secretary General compiled a second report on 
the nexus (UN General Assembly 2009b). In line with the sceptic position of some gov-
ernments, this report is also characterized by a rather careful approach to the issue. To 
be sure, climate change is identified as potential threat to national and international se-
curity in line with the earlier inputs by the British government. But it is mainly regarded 
as threat multiplier and not as a major source of conflict itself. The report identifies five 
channels through which the destabilizing effects of climate change come to play, 
namely the direct negative effects on human well-being, on overall economic develop-
ment, secondary effects of uncoordinated adaptation strategies, threats to national sov-
ereignty or territoriality, and finally international conflicts regarding natural resources 
(ibid.: 1). Yet the report does not establish any direct and causal relationship between 
climate change and violent conflicts. In contrast, it states that the interrelation has to be 
put into perspective, since other factors (such as structural poverty, uncontrolled urbani-
sation and unemployment) have to be regarded as crucial pre-condition for the eruption 
of violent conflicts.  
The report proceeds giving a quite general description of the social impacts of climate 
change; it is thereby primarily concerned with the predicted consequences for human 
well-being, whereas conflicts in general and intergovernmental conflicts in particular 
are hardly mentioned. Only later the report takes note of expected changes in territorial 
and intergovernmental conflicts, especially in the chapters dealing with environmental 
migration, resource conflicts and imminent territorial loss. Again it is pointed out, that 
the information provided should not be taken as an indication for a causal relationship 
between ecological changes and conflicts:      
“The empirical evidence on the relationship between climate change and conflict re-
mains sparse and largely anecdotal. (…) even with improved models and data, it re-
mains very difficult to predict conflict occurrences and events.” (ibid.: 17) 
The report of the Secretary General finally concludes that the UN Security Council is 
not the key forum for dealing with climate change and its negative effects: in the rec-
ommended proceedings, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) is identified as central body for climate change negotiations. The activities 
suggested in the final chapters of the report are multi-faceted and do not include meas-
ures of ‘classical’ security policy. Instead, it is suggested that the international commu-
nity should concentrate on the two main pillars of climate change policies, mitigation 
and adaptation, facilitated mainly through (financial) efforts of the developed countries. 
Besides that, it is mainly the concept of sustainable development that is considered to be 
suitable for reducing vulnerability towards climate change and therewith preventing 
climate-change induced conflicts. The international community should therefore 
“(…) redouble its efforts to ensure the sustainable and equitable development of all 
countries, notably through developed countries meeting their international commitments 
on development assistance.” (ibid.: 28)  
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The course of the discussions in the UN Security Council show that there was no clear 
shift towards reframing climate change as a security issue. The initiative of the British 
government was toned down to a large extent and was mainly discussed as a develop-
ment issue. This is not only to be traced back to a scientifically motivated scepticism 
regarding the conceptualization of a climate change/security nexus. More importantly, 
critical voices were increasingly concerned that a major role of the UN Security Council 
would put at risk the achievements of the UNFCCC processes. Scott (2008) has shown 
that it were especially the less developed countries that prevented the UN Security 
Council to deal with the subject more intensively: 
“Labelling climate change a threat to international peace and security opens up the pos-
sibility of the UNSC [United Nations Security Council, author’s note] taking a lead role 
in addressing the causes and consequences of climate change, and drawing on its (…) 
powers to require states to take action on the scale needed to really make a difference. 
(…)  Developing countries have equated the move to securitize climate change as a 
move away from the principle of CDR [common but differentiated responsibilities, au-
thor’s note] and an attempt on the part of the rich to impose policies on developing 
countries while abdicating responsibility for the climate change crisis.” (Scott 2008: 
616). 
Nevertheless, the fact alone that the UN Security Council as the key committee regard-
ing global security issues did deal with the subject had a major impact on the perception 
of security matters in the political debate on climate change at large. As it has been re-
flected in news coverage on the different sessions and in scientific discussions alike, the 
decision to take up the issue has been understood as a signal of a growing relevance of 
climate change for matters of (inter-)national security. The recognition of the debate 
through the highest international body of security politics has “(…) elevated climate 
change to a new level” (Sindico 2007: 33). 
 
2.2. Climate change and security in the European Union 
The EU debate on security implications of climate change was mainly based on a report 
by the European Commission that had been initiated under the German EU Council 
Presidency in 2007 and published in March 2008 under the title “Climate Change and 
International Security”. Therein, the European Commission and the EU High Represen-
tative, Javier Solana describe expected climate-change-induced security threats, both in 
a global and a more specific EU perspective (High Representative and European Com-
mission 2008).  
According to the report, there are a number of fundamental configurations in which cli-
mate change could be a critical factor escalating existing or even provoking new con-
flicts: those are conflicts over resources, economic damage and risk to coastal cities and 
critical infrastructure, loss of territory and border disputes, environmentally-induced 
migration, situations of fragility and radicalization, as well as tension over energy sup-
ply (ibid.: 3ff.). In addition, the international climate policy itself is believed to carry the 
inherent danger of fuelling already existing conflicts between the countries mainly re-
sponsible for greenhouse gas emissions and the countries that will be affected most by 
climate change. This could result both in North-South conflicts as well as South-South 
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conflicts (as e.g. in the case of China and India), and consequently lead to further desta-
bilisation of the international system.  
The report looks at threats with a classical, realistic conceptualization of security, focus-
ing mainly on threats to national security in a strict sense. In doing so, the report’s per-
spective is anyhow not limited to member states of the EU, but also identifies security 
threats in other regions of the world. Potential conflicts, which are expected for example 
in Africa and Southeast Asia, but also in the Middle East and Central Asia, are consid-
ered to have direct and indirect impacts on the EU. As a consequence, the mitigation 
and adaptation efforts of international climate policy are regarded as part of a preventive 
European security policy (ibid.: 1). Thereby, the whole political reaction to global cli-
mate change is declared a security measure. The report does not stop at this definitional 
question. It is clearly stated that the prospects of the European Union with regard to 
climate change-related security threats are not limited to the generally accepted meas-
ures of international climate policy. Rather, the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are assigned to play a 
specific and accompanying role when addressing the expected “security risks”: 
“The report considers how the full range of EU instruments, including Community and 
CFSP/ESDP action, can be used alongside mitigation and adaption policies to address 
security risks.” (ibid.: 2)  
In this context, special consideration is given to the potential of monitoring and early 
warning systems to be able to observe potentially threatening developments in non-EU 
regions: 
“Monitoring and early warning needs to include in particular situations of state fragility 
and political radicalisation, tensions over resources and energy supplies, environmental 
and socio-economic stresses, threats to critical infrastructures and economic assets, bor-
der disputes, impact on human rights and potential migratory movements.” (ibid.: 9) 
Furthermore, it is stated that the EU should enhance capabilities in civil protection, as 
well as civil and military instruments of crisis management and disaster response. 
In the subsequent report of the EU High Representative, this position is largely con-
firmed (High Representative 2008). Again, the support of adaptation efforts in countries 
particularly affected by climate change and enhanced dialogue structures are pointed 
out. However, it is maintained that  
“Climate change represents a fundamental challenge, and should be in the mainstream 
of EU foreign and security policies and institutions” (ibid.: 1). 
The increased use of geographic information systems and satellite data is again a top 
priority among the suggested measures by which the Union should prepare itself to aris-
ing threats. In Africa, for example, these systems aim at the use of data obtained from 
climate and migration observation networks (ibid.: 2). The close connections between 
those surveillance systems and security interests of the EU is underlined by the aims of 
the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) project, an EU-led initia-
tive for earth observation. Besides providing land, marine and atmosphere data, GMES 
should increasingly deliver climate change information and at the same time security-
related data: 
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“The GMES services will allow policy-makers in particular to: 
– prepare national, European and international legislation on environmental matters, in-
cluding climate change; 
– monitor implementation of this legislation; 
– have access to comprehensive and accurate information concerning security matters 
(e.g. for border surveillance);” (Commission of the European Communities 2009: 3) 
The security interests of the EU are here intermingled with environmental concerns and 
introduced by the back-door of general programs and initiatives related to environment 
and technology. 
Once more, the geographical focus of the High Representative’s report is remarkable: 
whereas the first report has taken a relatively broad perspective, the regions explicitly 
discussed in the second paper are Africa, the Middle East and the Arctic. This can par-
tially be explained with the relative proximity to EU sovereign territories, but it seems 
at least remarkable in view of energy security and resources relevant for the Union.  
To sum up, the different position papers by the EU Commission and the High Represen-
tative show some signs  of planning long-term exterritorial measures with military in-
volvement that are being legitimised by taking recourse to the climate change/security 
nexus. However, the overall development of the discussion in the EU can hardly be seen 
as a broad securitization of climate change. Most importantly, there are no signs so far 
for an avoidance of the common decision making mechanisms and established rules of 
the EU institutions by declaring a state of emergency, nor for other exceptional meas-
ures which would be necessary to establish a successful securitization as described by 
the Copenhagen School.  
  
2.3. Climate change and security in Germany 
The discussions in Germany on security implications of climate change have been pri-
marily influenced by the special report of the German government’s Advisory Council 
for Global Change (WBGU 2008). The basic statement of the report is that climate 
change is going to have implications which could soon overburden the adaptive capac-
ity of societies in the most seriously affected countries and therewith contribute to “(…) 
destabilization and violence, jeopardizing national and international security to a new 
degree” (ibid.: 1). Climate change is not only seen as exacerbating factor in existing 
conflicts, but as possible root cause for new conflicts, both on a national level and for 
the international system as a whole: 
“Climate change could well trigger national and international distributional conflicts 
and intensify problems already hard to manage such as state failure, the erosion of so-
cial order, and rising violence. In the worst affected regions, this could lead to the pro-
liferation of destabilization processes with diffuse conflict structures. These dynamics 
threaten to overstretch the established global governance system, thus jeopardizing in-
ternational stability and security.” (ibid.) 
The study focuses on a series of conflict constellations (such as fresh water scarcity or 
environmental migration, especially induced by sea level rise) which could ignite the 
described processes. After giving an overview over expected hot-spots of climate-
change induced conflicts, the study suggests an abundance of possible strategies how to 
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counteract the described developments. The differences between the two parts of the 
report are huge: whereas the analytical part on possible conflict constellations and their 
geographic distribution is characterized by a rather classical notion of conflict, the latter 
part does hardly suggest measures that would have to be taken by security policy. There 
is only one short section that clearly calls for the involvement of security actors in deal-
ing with the arising threats: 
“The specific conflict constellations (…) will be almost impossible to manage without 
support from police and military capacities, and therefore pose a challenge to classic se-
curity policy. In this context, a well-functioning cooperation between development and 
security policy will be crucial (…)” (ibid.: 6) 
In contrast, the overwhelming majority of recommended measures emphasize the need 
for a strengthening of cooperative elements in the international system, with a focus on 
greenhouse gas mitigation, climate change adaptation with supportive measures for 
countries mainly affected and, more generally, a reform and stabilisation of interna-
tional governance systems. 
The German parliament (Bundestag) was provided with the WBGU report together with 
an accompanying commentary of the German government (Bundesregierung). The 
commentary shows that the German executive takes a rather careful position regarding 
the link between climate change and security. It is pointed out that climate change 
should neither be declared as the greatest threat to humanity, nor should different threat 
scenarios, e.g. terrorism or poverty, be seen as competing (Deutscher Bundestag 2008: 
IV). This contrasts significantly with one of the main requirements for securitization as 
formulated by the Copenhagen scholars: 
“In the case of security, textual analysis (…) suggests that something is designated as an 
international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more important 
than other issues and should take absolute priority.” (Buzan et al. 1998: 24) 
Although arguing on the national level, the government’s position is interesting enough. 
It clearly refuses a prioritisation of climate change and emphasises that other issues do 
not play a subordinate role. The criticism of the government is anyhow not limited to 
this positioning of climate change in security discourses. Shortcomings are also identi-
fied in the analytical content of the report and the empirical methods are partly consid-
ered to be unclear and speculative.  
The German government raises general doubts that it will be possible to scientifically 
confirm the actual impact of climate change on existing or emerging conflicts as it has 
been claimed with regard to the Darfur conflict (Deutscher Bundestag 2008: V). Never-
theless, the government states that climate change could be an issue of civil-military 
cooperation (CIMIC) in the context of disaster management and preventive security 
measures and is therefore integrated in current strategic analyses for the mid- to long-
term orientation of the armed forces. Furthermore climate change is declared an issue 
also for early warning systems of civil and military intelligence services (ibid.: VII). All 
in all, the remarks however demonstrate a general scepticism towards the conjunction of 
climate change with security matters. This becomes even clearer when looking at the 
policy recommendations the government itself draws from the WBGU expertise. In the 
second half of the commentary for the Bundestag, the government describes a set of 
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possible measures to counteract the impacts of climate change as they become increas-
ingly felt. The overwhelming majority of those measures is clearly not part of the secu-
rity sector. In only one of them, a traditional security perspective is taken when the gov-
ernment calls for an extension of global monitoring and early warning systems with 
possible adjustments in secret service activities (ibid.: IX). The other possible instru-
ments involve a number of political fields, with the main stress being put on develop-
ment policies. The government discusses enhanced dialogue processes, both within the 
EU and the UN; a strengthening of civil conflict prevention; adjustments in the Euro-
pean and the German development aid towards a growing significance of water man-
agement and rural development projects; the support of UN reforms with regard to de-
velopment, humanitarian aid and environment; the peace-building effect of an increas-
ing renewable energy production etc. (ibid.: VII ff.) To sum up, climate change is pri-
marily considered to be a matter of development and foreign policy. 
 
3. Human Security: an alternative to the military logic? 
In light of our short review of the developments and discussions led at different political 
levels, a securitization of climate change in the narrower sense of the Copenhagen 
School seems to be questionable. The processes described in this theoretical framework 
match most closely with the developments in the EU where, at least to some extent, 
decidedly military perspectives have been included in all position papers of the Com-
mission and the High Representative. These perspectives have thus been sanctioned by 
the highest executive authorities of the Union.  
Yet in our view the securitization approach can also be helpful in explaining why the 
other political settings analyzed in this study have shown relatively little sign of an in-
creased interpretation of climate change as a security-political issue by decision makers, 
although popular and media discourses on the issue have been increasingly widespread. 
The rejection of a securitizing speech act and, in our case, even the partial de-
securitization by the executive authorities in Germany and the UN can be explained by 
the extensive and unclear implications that a re-framing of climate change in that sense 
would have brought about. Governments and international institutions may hesitate to 
declare a highly complex, multi-sited and cross-cutting issue like climate change a secu-
rity threat precisely because they know about the manifold possible implications and 
repercussions of such a “securitizing move”. 
Otherwise our results give reason to doubt an intrinsic, “neo-Schmittian” logic of secu-
rity discourses, which would imply that fields once declared as security issue by author-
ized speech acts could hardly be re-converted into arenas of ‘normal’ political delibera-
tion. Though strong securitizing speech acts by executive institutions do definitely exist 
in the example of the EU, the security-related activities with regard to climate change 
can well be interpreted as an “incremental normalisation”, just as NEAL (2009) has 
suggested in his analysis of origins and activities of the European border agency 
FRONTEX. He concludes: 
“While securitization theory has done much to problematize the construction of security 
threats, practices of government have become too complex, too plural and too diverse to 
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maintain the plausibility of a sovereign centred, nominalist understanding of security. 
(...) This study has shown that although the spectacle of discursive securitization can be 
identified fairly easily in the institutions of the EU, any causal relationship with policy 
changes or outcomes is much harder to discern. (...) 
Given that this complexity far exceeds that of the political theatre of securitization, we 
should be less concerned with a spectacular dialectic of norm/exception and more con-
cerned with an ongoing process of incremental normalization that is not quite spectacu-
lar or controversial enough to draw attention to itself.”  (Neal 2009: 351ff.) 
He maintains that the peculiar difference between a strong security language by EU 
representatives and a far more subtle change in European policies can be put down to 
three circumstances that prevent a direct impact on security practices: the complexities 
of organizational behaviour, a lacking capacity to effectively decide upon measures of 
sovereign exceptionalism, and a growing pluralism of security and risk (ibid.). In this 
environment, it is difficult to draw a clear line between a state of exception and normal 
politics: 
“These processes and practices are driven not simply by a logic of crisis, emergency and 
exception, but through the formation of linkages between diverse policy areas, different 
technologies and security professionals of different specializations. It could be consid-
ered that these linkages constitute a ‘security continuum’, rather than a discrete sphere 
of security that can be distinguished from ‘normal’ politics.” (ibid.)  
In our view, the discussions on security implications of climate change in the EU follow 
a similar logic: securitizing moves by the European Commission can be identified, but 
clear policy outcomes are lacking. Rather, the climate change discussion contributes to 
the establishment of a preventive security policy in which environmental and security 
concerns are increasingly discussed together and implemented in joint programs. Never-
theless, the European policies do thereby not rely on the proclamation of a state of ex-
ception and do not involve irregular decision-making processes. It could be shown that 
the global (as well as the European and the German) debates on security implications of 
climate change are led with a broader approach to security, increasingly detaching it 
from its classical binding to foreign policy and its primarily military logic. Suddenly, 
thus, new issues come into the focus of security debates: poverty and survival strategies 
of local communities, health issues and questions of political freedom and participation. 
The United Nations have summarized those concerns in their Millennium Goals with 
the calls for freedom from want and freedom from fear (ANNAN 2000). In this context, 
military security is complemented or even replaced by the concept of human security - a 
term that has been established by the United Nations Development Program when dis-
cussing a possible peace dividend after the end of the Cold War (UNDP 1994). Since 
then, the term has also spread rapidly in human geography (Bohle & O`Brien 2006; 
Barnett & Adger 2007; Nordas & Gleditsch 2007). 
This transformation of security concerns holds the advantage of shifting the main focus 
towards the concerns and vulnerabilities of affected individuals or social groups. Simple 
neo-Malthusian explanations are dismissed and processes and structures of poverty and 
oppression are brought into the focus. The military logic of safeguarding national inter-
ests is hence replaced by development-oriented perspectives, sometimes in a outspo-
kenly critical perspective (Bohle & O`Brien 2006).       
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Brzoska (2008: 205) has already pointed out, however, that there are only minor differ-
ences in the analyses and projections regarding the climate/security nexus in the diverse, 
newly published reports – regardless of the fact that different concepts of security are 
applied and widely diverging measures are suggested. Moreover, the discourse on hu-
man security does not automatically exclude military options. The report of the UN 
General Secretary treated above, for example, considers the impacts on human and na-
tional security right next to each other (UN General Assembly 2009b: 4), and the 
WBGU report states that support from the police and military forces is required to ad-
dress the development and security concerns that may emerge from the “failure of disas-
ter management systems after extreme weather events and increasing environmental 
migration” (WBGU 2008: 6). 
Based on this lack of a clear distinction from classic, arms-based security concepts, 
Chandler (2008a, b) has sharply criticised the concept of human security. Two of his 
arguments are of particular interest in our context: First, he argues that the concept is 
based on a strong and analytically indistinct exaggeration of emerging security threats 
after the Cold War: 
“It is clear that political elites and radical advocates of human security approaches both 
share a normative desire to exaggerate the existence of threats. It is here that human se-
curity advocates come into their own (…) with their assertions that, in our globalized 
world, everything is interconnected and interdependent (…). In the absence of tradi-
tional enemies, human security approaches fill the gap with the securitization of every 
issue from health, to the economy, to the environment.” (Chandler 2008a: 435) 
As a result, today’s societal problems, be they drugs and diseases or terrorism and envi-
ronmental problems, are all declared as highly interdependent security threats, adding 
up to even bigger risks for humanity. Second, these threats are localised mainly in de-
veloping countries, where failed states serve as background for the alleged threats.  
“The sharpened focus of the threat stemming from non-Western states can be seen in the 
human security concerns around the dangers posed by the ‘failed state’ and the need for 
policy to be framed in the terms of the security-development-‘nexus’ – that is, the focus 
on the interplay between human rights, poverty-reduction, good governance and state 
capacity-building. (…) The problematization of the non-Western state, facilitated by the 
human security framework, is as central to the security discourses shaped by the unilat-
eral ‘realist’ ‘war on terror’ as it is to the multilateral ‘critical’ discourses of poverty-
reduction, sustainable development and climate change adaptation.” (ibid.) 
Thus, the well-meaning discourse on human security results in a new kind of securitiza-
tion that involves all possible political fields and opens the road for humanitarian inter-
vention as well as for unilateral, “realistic” measures. As the hegemonic industrial states 
are not able to pursue all their diverse and sometime contradictory goals equally, Chan-
dler argues, with the human security concepts they now hold a ’carte blanche’ in hands, 
providing them with total freedom in their foreign and security policies towards devel-
oping countries. The discourse on human security in effect justifies everything and 
doesn’t require anything: 
“The attraction of human security approaches would appear to be that they, on the one 
hand, reflect this confusion, portraying the external world as a complex and ever more 
threatening environment, and, on the other hand, legitimize and institutionalize the lack 
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of policymaking capacity, encouraging the shedding of policy responsibility and view-
ing the world less open for intervention.” (Chandler 2008a: 436). 
The critique offers important insight into the intrinsic political risks of extended security 
concepts. This is especially valuable in view of the growing tendency to link climate 
change to security issues: here, the moral geography of a human security shifts the ac-
tual security problems into the Global South, allowing the industrialized countries as the 
main emitters to distract from their historical responsibility for climate change (cf. 
Trombetta 2008: 593). Local actors and institutions in developing countries are primar-
ily drawn as vulnerable and in need of protection and therewith subordinated to inter-
ventions that can be connected to military measures. The paradigm of human security is 
then no longer in opposition to the discourses originally criticised by it; it can rather 
serve as background for an interest-driven national security policy.  
 
4. Conclusion 
With regard to the political actors and statements presented in this paper, a securitiza-
tion of climate change in the sense of the Copenhagen school can only be observed to a 
limited extent. All relevant statements by authorised decision makers at the three differ-
ent levels illustrate that the original initiatives – both from the relevant committees 
themselves and from external sources – have been weakened during the discussion and 
transformed into broader security concepts. The concept of human security itself, which 
in many cases replaced the classic, ‘realistic’ security concept, entails questionable im-
plications. In particular, it lacks the essential analytical sharpness, thus possibly con-
tributing to arbitrary expansions of security notions and initiatives.  
 
 ‘Strong’ securitization ‘Humanitarian’ securitiza-
tion  
‘Popular/media’ securiti-
zation 
Notion of 
security  
 
Mainly military security,  
traditionally oriented at 
nation states or international 
bodies 
‚Human security’, oriented 
at individual well-being 
Referring to varying types 
of violent conflicts   
Underlying 
concepts  
Speech acts, political con-
structivism 
Vulnerabilities of individu-
als and groups 
Determinism,  
(neo-)Malthusianism 
Authors 
(a.o.)  
Buzan et al. (1998)  
Brauch (2009) 
IHDP (1999) 
Barnett & Adger (2007) 
Homer-Dixon (1999)  
Welzer (2008) 
 
Fig. 1: Types of securitization  
In a wider conceptualization, three types of securitization should therefore be distin-
guished (cf. Fig. 1): first, a ‘strong’ securitization as represented by the Copenhagen 
School, mainly based on linguistic constructions and their effects in terms of a tradi-
tional security policy. Second, a ‘humanitarian’ securitization in terms of development 
politics, primarily focused on the broadly defined security of individuals and social 
groups. In this type of securitization, military answers play a secondary role. Third, a 
media-based, popular, and largely affirmative kind of securitization, with deterministic, 
often neo-Malthusian scenarios as the basis for a broader discourse on security issues 
and an influential background for the two former types. 
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With these distinctions, however, little is said about the concrete results for implementa-
tion and action ‘on the ground’. The broader understanding of securitization gives the 
opportunity to involve and search into other actors than political elites, and activities far 
beyond speech acts. Furthermore, concrete practices of actors in the relevant fields of 
security politics and policies fields have to be analysed (cf. Bigo 2000; Neal 2009). 
With the increasing reference being made to the concept of human security, the actors 
and activities in the humanitarian field are of particular interest.  
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